Every major geopolitical shock creates the conditions for the availability heuristic to dominate investor decision-making. The availability heuristic, which Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky first systematically described in their 1973 paper "Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability," is the cognitive pattern by which people estimate the likelihood of an event based on how readily examples come to mind. Memorable, vivid, emotionally charged events are recalled easily, and easy recall inflates perceived probability.
The Hormuz crisis since late February 2026 has delivered all of the inputs that activate this bias most powerfully. Dramatic news footage of naval confrontations. Daily gas price alerts showing 30% increases at the pump since March. The IEA characterizing the situation as the greatest global energy security challenge in its history. And, as of this morning, the personal economic signal of 18,000 Canadians losing jobs in a single month. Each individual piece of information is accurate. The aggregation of these vivid inputs into a probability estimate for the most catastrophic scenario is where the bias operates.
Why Historical Base Rates Matter Here
The availability heuristic's distortion is clearest when it is set against the historical base rate. The Strait of Hormuz has faced major disruption threats in 1973, during the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq War, during the 1987 to 1988 Operation Earnest Will, in 2011 to 2012, and in the June 2025 preliminary conflict. In each case, global shipping found partial accommodations, alternative routes were developed, and oil prices that spiked on the disruption eventually retraced as markets stabilized or the geopolitical situation resolved. The current disruption is the most severe in the series. It is not categorically different from the historical pattern.
Gerd Gigerenzer at the Max Planck Institute has documented extensively that people's estimates of event probability spike dramatically immediately following vivid related events and normalize over time. The post-event period, which the Hormuz crisis has produced continuously since February, extends the window of peak bias. Investors making rebalancing decisions about their energy exposure right now are making those decisions at a moment when their probability estimates for the worst-case scenario are at their most distorted.
The Compound Effect of the Jobs Data
This morning's Labour Force Survey adds a second cognitive layer. Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory, formalized in their 1979 paper, established that losses feel roughly twice as powerful as equivalent gains. The April jobs miss of 18,000 will register psychologically as a significant negative event for clients who are already in an availability heuristic-amplified anxiety state. The counterbalancing gains from the same market session, Agnico Eagle and Barrick up more than 3%, Shopify recovering 5.8%, Wheaton Precious Metals reporting record earnings, will receive less psychological weight despite being genuine positive data points.
The compounding of availability heuristic activation with loss aversion is the most dangerous behavioral combination for portfolio decision quality. It is the pattern Terrance Odean documented in his 1998 research on individual investor trading: investors who are most active during periods of market stress consistently underperform relative to those who hold. The cost of acting on the bias is not hypothetical. It is the return gap between the median active response and the passive baseline.
Restoring Base Rate Thinking Without Dismissing Real Risk
The distinction between de-biasing and reassurance is the technical challenge for advisors in this environment. Reassurance, telling clients that everything will be fine, does not address the availability heuristic. It provides a competing narrative that the client can discount as advisor optimism. De-biasing requires surfacing the base rate explicitly: how many prior Hormuz disruptions resulted in permanent structural damage to the global oil market? What does the current diplomatic progress, including the MOU framework being negotiated this week, suggest about the trajectory?
This framing, consistent with Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein's nudge architecture, does not require the client to abandon their concern. It requires them to hold their concern alongside the historical base rate and make a decision that reflects both, rather than only the vivid recent experience. That is the advisor's technical contribution during a period of heightened behavioral activation: not to be more optimistic than the situation warrants, but to provide the base rate context that human cognitive architecture systematically fails to generate on its own.